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The Impossible Dream: Consensus-Based International
Climate Change Responses
Beth Edmondson, Monash University Gippsland Campus, Victoria,
Australia
Abstract: The challenges of global climate change are both too deep and too urgent for the interna-
tional political community to continue to emphasise consensus over changed economic and political
practices. The key ideas of the 20th century, which promised greater economic affluence and broader
distributions of political independence, are in the process of being overtaken by 21st century imperatives
of resolving economic and authority-related uncertainties. This paper argues that the ‘shadow of the
future’ has shortened to reveal the natural environment as an ongoing site of contested authority
between states.
Keywords: Political Independence, Contested Authority
Introduction
THE CHALLENGES OF global climate change are both too deep and too urgentfor the international political community to emphasise consensus over changed eco-nomic and political practices. The key ideas of the 20th century, which promised
greater economic affluence and broader distributions of political independence, are
in the process of being overtaken by 21st century imperatives of resolving uncertainties
concerning economic production and potential sources of durable political authority. The
magnitude of global climate change impacts are such that replacement technologies and al-
ternative energy resources will not prevent rising sea levels from inundating cities, or rivers
from drying as rainfall patterns alter dramatically (Dow andDowning 2007). Although human
populations might well re-locate themselves and develop new forms of production, the
challenges of creating new forms of political organisation and human association will require
re-consideration of fundamental political structures and entities.
This paper argues that the ‘shadow of the future’ has shortened to reveal the natural envir-
onment as an ongoing site of contested authority between states (Donnelly 2000; Paterson
2000; Bearce, Floros andMcKibben 2009). Under the influence of this shadow, states, inter-
governmental organisations and private actors are grappling with new uncertainties regarding
their authority and decision-making capacities. For many actors, these uncertainties extend
to their perceptions of interests and priorities as they seek to accommodate new knowledge
and to reconcile changing expectations as predicted levels of threat alter their goals. While
there continue to be substantive debates regarding the causes and specific likely impacts of
global climate change, scientific consensus is now well established regarding the roles of
greenhouse emissions as contributors to increasing temperatures (Stern 2009).
The key point to current and future global climate change debates and negotiations is,
therefore, not how to prevent or minimise specific impacts so much as how to respond and
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adapt to them (HumanDevelopment Report 2007/2008). Findingways of coping and adjusting
practices, lifestyle and forms of association now pose challenges for actors who are accus-
tomed to forms of institutional stability as sources of effective political and economic organ-
isation. This will require new forms of political leadership, structures and sites of authority
as people, governments and economic actors grapple, both collectively and individually,
with new material and regulatory circumstances. These observations lead to the realisation
that climate change poses genuine challenges to current ideas about how human societies
are politically organised and how these societies configure themselves as sovereign states
as they seek to pursue their interests within the international political community (Eckersley
2004; Human Development Report 2007/2008).
As political and economic practices are altered by climate change consequences, it seems
likely that established patterns of international negotiation and the norms of international
relations might also be altered. As the impacts of climate change unfold in the 21st century,
states’ practices and expectations of achieving their political interests through international
diplomacy, trade and collective security arrangements will also be altered. These changes
can be expected to extend to the manner in which states seek to represent and extend their
interests, including pursuing economic prosperity and securing their rights to political parti-
cipation and representation within international organisations (Hoffman and Hoffman 2008;
Stern 2009). Among other things, it is increasingly difficult to imagine that governments
will be able to find ways of effectively responding to global climate change without making
decisions that are not widely supported by their constituencies. Notwithstanding their import-
ant contributions to climate change responses, including in shaping the expectations of voting
constituencies, environmental groups, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations
occupy different structural roles within the international political community. Most import-
antly, they differ from states in the crucial regard of not holding responsibilities for the
economic security or ranges of political and economic rights that citizens might enjoy.
Responding to the challenges of global climate change will, therefore, require substantive
adjustment to the practices, forms of association and institutional dimensions of the interna-
tional political community. Among the required changeswill be the abandonment of consensus
style decision-making within collective action agencies. Consensus decision-making has
been common to major international forums where negotiations have been hoped to produce
effective lasting agreements (Young 2002). As international environmental agencies and
inter-governmental authorities seek to implement agreements and enhance compliance among
parties, consensus based decisions have been perceived as favourable contributors to good
outcomes. These views are supported by the historical roles of international norms and cus-
tomary law where customary practices relied heavily upon consensus in producing change
and implementation of agreed practices. The histories of international norms and law suggest
that consensus has often been achieved through behavioural practices, rather than through
extensive negotiations over agreement details (Matthews 1991; Koremenos 2005).
The Role of Consensus
Throughout the 20th century, it became possible to identify particular conditions under which
consensus could be promoted (Haas, 1989; Sebenius 1992). For instance, trust and presumed
compliance among parties, low risks of free-rider behaviour and small log-jams in negotiations
over specific issues all create favourable conditions for negotiated consensus (Young 1994).
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Similar dynamics can be experienced when the costs of participating in establishing new
international agreements are low, and/or the costs of accepting the behavioural constraints
specified in an agreement are minimal. By contrast, high intensity interests and decisions
that impact directly upon domestic economic and political interests decrease the likelihood
of international consensus (Kϋtting 2000). Each of these factors is relevant in the context of
global climate change impacts, reducing the likelihood of international consensus because
climate change agreements require complex decisions and complex forms of knowledge
(Haas 1993).
Table 1: Conditions for Consensus
Impact Upon MechanismsNegotiating Parameters
Collective action problems that lend them-
selves to simple, agreed, collective action re-
Institutional bargaining succeeds when issues
lend themselves to contract-based solutions
sponses are more likely to be subject to inter-
national agreement
Principles of equity and common purpose
contribute to the effectiveness, robustness and
durability of regimes and institutions
Arrangements that participants accept as
equitable, rather than efficient, are necessary
for successful institutional bargaining
Simple solutions tend to enable unanimous
agreement among participants
The existence of salient solutions increases
the likelihood of success in institutional bar-
gaining
Negotiations can fail to reach agreement when
participants do not trust each other to comply
Successful institutional bargaining is more
likely when clear-cut, effective, compliance
mechanisms are available with the terms of arrangements once these are
established
Under these conditions, negotiators are more
likely to accept higher costs, or loss of advant-
Exogenous shocks or crises increase the
probability of successful negotiation of inter-
national regimes age, but the agreements reached are less likely
to afford institutional flexibility or offer last-
ing solutions
In the late 20th century, there was a level of heightened optimism concerning international
consensus based decision-making following the successful establishment of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the ready implementation of targets associated
with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Oberthϋr and Ott
1999). The stalling patterns surrounding the Kyoto Protocol and its protracted difficulties
in achieving wide acceptance among major emitters of greenhouse gases accurately reflect
the manner in which issues that are susceptible to iterative decision-making can initially
seem likely sources of consensus but are ultimately likely to prevent it as a result of ‘next
time’ dynamics among participants (Scharpf 1989; Kϋtting 2000). In the formation of the
IPCC and theMontreal Protocol, negotiations benefited from a central focus upon responding
to new issues on the international political agenda, which provided decision-making early
momentum associated with an early wave of ‘we must do something’ urgent international
political will.
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While global climate change continues to present new challenges and to raise new polit-
ical issues for discussion, these now arise in a broader context of issues complexity. In addi-
tion, contemporary negotiations are constrained by some historical difficulties in achieving
and/or implementing international agreements (Revkin 2007). As Stern (2009) cogently ar-
gues:
Any global deal must be designed with a keen eye not only on how a very broad-based
agreement can be built, but also on how it can be sustained. This is one of the reasons
why the three principles of effectiveness, efficiency and equity are so important to the
foundation and guiding ideals for a deal – if any one of these principles is badly and
consistently violated, consensus will be very different to build and sustain. But there
is much more to building and sustaining a deal than good design structure (Stern 2009:
181).
More recent obstacles to consensus also reflect the extent to which global climate change
issues are resistant to programmatic decision-making (Cox and Jacobsen 1973; Feld, Jordan
and Hurwitz 1988). The need to accommodate diverse interests and new knowledge increase
these tendencies (Haas 1993; Paterson 2000).
These observations suggest that under the changing political conditions associated with
unfolding global climate change impacts, consensus is now both less likely to be achieved,
and less likely to produce good outcomes. Indeed, when it is achieved in establishing
agreements, it will be likely to be linked with expectations of low levels of compliance and/or
weak enforcement mechanisms, or when the nature of issues being addressed is politically
straightforward (Young 2002; Stokke and Vidas 1996.) This change in the prospects of
consensus decision making within the international political environment cannot be reduced
to perceptions of low risk arising from global climate change, or an absence of political will,
as is sometimes suggested. Rather, it is the enduring presence of political will and the potential
risks to core institutions that cripples states in their domestic and international adaptation to
global climate change impacts. Where states have made good progress in responding to
particular potential impacts of climate change, these tend to have occurred where domestic
political interests could readily be met through new policies or sector located initiatives,
such as in the growth of a sugar production/ ethanol fuel industry alongside a hybrid motor
vehicle industry in Brazil (Hoffman and Hoffman 2008).
In the 1980s and 1990s, umbrella style agreements and comprehensive regimes were rel-
atively easily negotiated (Hempel 1996). States could comfortably participate in international
discussions and secure their enduring rights to international political participation and de-
cision-making by involving themselves in multi-lateral collective action agreements. Such
agreements only rarely required specific action.More commonly, they enabled the establish-
ment of new international agencies or authorities to act on behalf of parties, or they entailed
a step in an iterative agreement among limited parties (such as inmany regional environmental
agreements) (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997).
In the 21st century, these forms of international agreements have been revealed as poorly
equipped to deliver effective responses to climate change challenges and the changed inter-
national political community. This difference can be partly explained by the increased
complexities and levels of inter-relatedness evident in issues packaging and policy related
choices. In the 1980s and 1990s as the first major international revelations of climate change
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were debated, states confronted simpler choices. They could behave as ‘world leaders’ by
participating in international agreements, creating new authorities, agencies and organisations.
They could decide not to participate in such negotiations, but reserve the right to join later
decision-making forums.
It is now more difficult for states to make clear assessments of the relative merits, costs,
burdens and benefits of participating in specific conferences, conventions and treaties
(Biermann and Bauer 2005; DiMento and Doughman 2007a). It is likely that states will re-
assert their superiority over other political entities, albeit with expanded concessions to their
collective responsibilities (Paterson 2000; Archibugi 2001). It is difficult to continue to believe
in the dream of global consensus under these conditions as the power of states is limited,
notwithstanding their abilities to retain primacy as international political actors. States’
abilities to claim particular forms of authoritative priority under the changed political condi-
tions arising from climate change will be diminished as specific climate change impacts
become more easily identified in local contexts and thereby challenge their central political
institutions.
Rights, Responsibilities and Authority
One of the impacts of global climate change will be to shift the balance between rights-based
understandings of states and those that perceive states as key holders of responsibilities
(Bonanate 1995; Eckersley 2004). This will be a key feature of the changes to state sover-
eignty, such that a new debate might be opened concerning whether or not these new shifts
represent a further evolution, or whether they are producing a new entity. However, states
are also ‘old-hands’ in the field of responsibilities and it may be that scholarly attention to
their rights-based structures have tended to disregard or downplay the presence of inherent
political responsibilities (Bonanate 1995). Among these established responsibilities wemight
identify states’ roles in protecting their territory from external threat and extending recognition
to other states as valid actors in the international political community as inherent features
of their functional capacities as sovereign authorities (Krasner 1999; Bonanate 1995). If we
can re-conceptualise sovereignty as a primary source of responsibilities (rather than rights)
then perhaps we might establish new authoritative structures and institutions that are better
equipped for achieving urgent and broadly implemented responses (DiMento and Doughman
2007b).
Global climate change threatens economic progress and locks states into recognising their
inherent responsibilities for adapting to their changing physical environments. States hold
responsibilities for effective adaptation strategies because these underpin their abilities to
ensure their people and ecosystems have access to lifestyle sustaining resources (Human
Development Report 2007/2008; Thompson 2001). As climate change debates have shifted
from problems identification to mitigation to adaptation priorities in the early 21st century,
states are experiencing increasing pressure to accept new responsibilities for responding to
the political challenges of global climate change. As many states have become less econom-
ically isolated and less politically autonomous in the international community over the last
century or so, it is their responsibilities, duties and obligations that bind them to interdependent
activities and decisions (Krasner 2009; Young 1994). This is reflected in the new realities
of the mass growth of multilateral agreements, treaties and conventions of various kinds in
recent decades (Young 2002).
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The legitimacy of states as central actors within the international political community re-
quires both internal and external recognition of sovereign authority as a site of collective
responsibility for preserving international common goods, including managing potential in-
ternational political instability and social disorder (Bonanate 1995; Biermann and Bauer
2005). Addressing the political challenges of global climate change requires the autonomy
of states to be mediated by new international decision-making parameters that support col-
lective responsibilities among states (Postiglione 2001; Biermann and Bauer 2005). The
prerogatives and privileges of statehood will be transformed by mechanisms to increase in-
ternational accountability through strengthened mechanisms for global governance and/or
elevated expectations of informed citizens. These changes in the extent and depth of states’
levels of authority will produce a further evolution in what is understood as state sovereignty.
Rather than producing a revolutionary change, it seems more likely that such changes will
be achieved through more familiar evolutionary processes of iterative adjustment and cir-
cumstantial accommodation (Philpott 2001).
The nature of the modern international political system and its juridical framework means
that for modern states, their abilities to govern, produce and trade depends upon the availab-
ility andmanagement of an extensive list of resources.Maintaining domestic and international
political stability through sovereignty, security and economic growth are intimately aligned
with resource use. States then struggle to respond positively to threats to their resource sup-
plies. They experience policy paralysis that produces ‘wait and see’ approaches. The diverse
characteristics of global climate change consequences are such that global consensus is not
only too slow, and insufficiently reliable, it is also a source of individual differentiation
through its reliance upon links with the vision of global democracy. After all, ‘fostering
consensus across countries is an intensely political process in which self-interest, mispercep-
tions and mischief can play powerful roles’ (Stern 2009: 181).
States rely simultaneously upon their functional capacities and status as sovereign author-
ities (Edmondson and Levy 2008). Their physical environments impact significantly upon
their abilities to exert authority, secure their borders and pursue economic prosperity. In
turn, these factors determine their abilities to provide rights and protections. These established
sources of international political stability encourage confidence in the abilities of the inter-
national political community to reform its key institutions. The unfolding consequences of
global climate change provide salutary reminders to all states that they do not hold functional
capacities because of their sovereign authority (although this is crucial to their abilities to
maintain domestic social and political cohesion and orderly conduct in their international
dealings). States’ abilities to develop and maintain their functional capacities depend upon
their physical resources and natural environments, such as access to water and energy re-
sources which are key determinants of states’ abilities to establish and support agricultural
and industrial production and maintain their human populations (Schmidt 1989; Young
2002).
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Figure 1: Key Goals Sectors for Contemporary States
Political values, which have long been central drivers of domestic government regulation
and policy directions, must now also become central drivers of international regulation and
policy directions. In a sense, it is the recognition of sovereign statehood as a fundamental
component of the international system that enables the continuing existence of the present
international political community, by apportioning rights and responsibilities to states. It is
because sovereignty provides states with privileged status as political authorities, and, thereby,
both permits and demands their participation in domestic legislative activities, international
trade, and territorial defence that wemight now expect the emergence of stronger commitment
to identified political interests.
It is important in climate change related discussions to bear in mind the manner in which
state based practices and beliefs in autonomy and sovereign independence among states are
not values neutral, but carry deeply ingrained implicit acceptance of competition among
states. The central structures and institutions of the modern international political economy
reflect this dualism. For instance, most states accept the validity of international law, at least
most of the time although nothing compels them to do so. Most states engage in complex
patterns of trade and diplomacy, although doing so sometimes compromises specific goals.
Further, most states endeavour to keep most of their promises to others, most of the time
(Krasner 2002).
Institutions, Values and Structures
The establishment of international institutions and organisations for environmental manage-
ment and regulation imply a change in the meaning and significance of sovereignty, power
and national interests. These denote a marked shift in international politics and diplomatic
behaviour in favour of international, multilateral, and often multi-functional bodies, tran-
scending the interests of individual states and straddling international and domestic political
spheres (Young 2002; Krasner 2009). Negotiation, cooperation and collective action are
evident in levels of information and data collection, research and monitoring projects, regu-
lation of domestic and international trade. Negotiation, bargaining and international agree-
ments are also characteristics of resource development, and economic and security configur-
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ations. These have become central features of a complex network of international relations,
governance mechanisms, international law, policy formulation and analytical approaches.
By and large, states continue to prefer international political arrangements, structures and
institutions that consolidate their rights to political independence. Notwithstanding the growth
of multilateral agreements and their implications for sovereign autonomy among states, it
remains the case that states continue to assert and re-assert their rights to political autonomy.
For instance, states continue to assert control over their borders and the flows of people and
goods across them. They regulate the activities of key social and economic actors within
their borders and they reiterate their supreme rights to determine their political structures
and institutions.
Although existing structures and institutions of the international political community
display some fundamental acceptance of global interdependency, most notably with regards
to collective security arrangements, in other respects, they remain premised upon high levels
of autonomy and independence among states (Young 2002). This might be understood as a
consequence of traditional two level behaviour and policy approaches by states through
which their domestic and international interests and actions were largely held to entail sep-
arate spheres, with discrete goals. While the latter half of the 20th century produced many
instances of states displaying willingness to accept and share economic interdependencies,
few instances of ready acceptance of political interdependencies can be found.
It is tempting to believe that solutions to these dilemmas might lie in more effective gov-
ernance mechanisms or greater enforceability and compliance strategies in multilateral re-
sponses to global climate change. However, these are unlikely to be sufficient to produce
the wells of state based responsibilities required for universal behaviour change, and they
are unlikely to be direct contributors to effective adaptation. Although international law will
be important, it only works within the broader institutional parameters constructed and sup-
ported by states and their collective structures (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Roberts and
Parks 2007). Hence, it will be necessary for more fundamental change to occur in the central
institutions of states and their sources of political authority.
Mutual interdependencies between states might be expected to result in conflict as states
compete for access to resources (Roberts and Parks 2007). However, climate change impacts
are also likely to produce other dynamics within the international political community as
states seek to establish new forms of certainty in their dealings with each other. Notwithstand-
ing these shared political imperatives, states will be required to accommodate new challenges
that include reasserting their primacy. As states seek to respond to the new political challenges
and responsibilities produced by adaptation strategies, their ranges of preferred and acceptable
forms of behaviour and policy choices will also alter. Contemporary states hold forms of
sovereignty that provide themwith authority over the use and ownership of resources within
their territory, and this authority-territory-resources nexus lies at the heart of their abilities
to govern (Edmondson and Levy 2008). Arguably, it is the same nexus that will enable their
abilities to more fully accommodate responsibilities for meeting the political challenges as-
sociated with global climate change, based on its centrality in earlier evolutions in the
structural associations of sovereign states.
As a consequence of sovereign statehood, international law provides states with formal
equality and this is apparent in their abilities to recognise their rights to legitimate participation
in legal and diplomatic interactions (Bonanate 1995). Sovereign states hold rights and re-
sponsibilities as independent, individual, autonomous entities. They are able to exercise au-
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thority by making decisions, taking actions and freely exercising governmental power
within the scope of their territories. Within the international political community, sovereign
states hold exclusive rights to make laws concerning the use of resources and to control the
movement of goods and people within their territories. They also hold rights to control and
maintain channels of communication within their borders, to create and support societies
according to their visions and values of social order, harmony and prosperity, and to wage
war against those who challenge their territorial integrity (Edmondson and Levy 2008).
However, in the workings of the international political community, states are also imbued
with a degree of accountability to their peers. This is apparent in the way that all states are
expected to respect the borders maintained by others and to uphold the principles of collective
security. The key distinction between states and other actors lies in states holding ‘political
responsibility for governing, defending and promoting the welfare of a human community’
by virtue of their sovereign nature (Fowler and Bunck 1995). While non-state actors fulfil
a range of requirements in the modern integrated political environment and are often crucial
in preserving orderly conduct among states, they remain dependent upon the validation of
sovereign states (Hoffman 1997).
Ongoing Dilemmas for Sovereignty
A key weakness in sovereignty as an organising principle for relations between states, and
their identities as supreme political actors in world affairs, lies in the fact that it does not
create functional or real equality between them. Instead, it provides a façade through which
unequal forms of ‘equality’ are maintained and through which the independence promised
by sovereignty has been something of a holy grail for modern states, especially those shaped
by liberal institutional ideals. This has created a so-called ‘equality among states’ which has
promoted, supported and reinforced by forms of collective decision-making (Hoffman 1997).
The localised impacts of climate change and their challenges to states’ rights of autonomy
will highlight the extent to which this theoretical legal equality contributes little to the
practical, functional dimensions of governmental authority as not all states exert supreme
authority over the same range of issues (Matthew 2007). States have been accustomed to
individually determining areas of political activity over which they require supreme authority.
They have also held rights to select areas in which they might share or delegate authority to
other institutions when such delegations have supported their specific interests. However,
global climate change impacts are in the process of dramatically altering states’ abilities to
claim and exert such rights and simultaneously extending their fields of shared jurisdictional
responsibilities (Bonanate 1995; Postiglione 2001).
In terms of international policy making, international leaders are rendered powerless by
their vulnerability to electoral sensibilities that remain insensitive or unwilling to accept the
costs of reducing climatic upheavals that have begun to be experienced. Political and business
leaders find themselves in a position where they need to lead rather than respond to public
opinion. The decisions they are required to make, and the responsibilities they must assume
in order to avoid the worst case climate change scenarios, will negatively impact upon daily
activities in all societies (Stern 2009). States must now assume new responsibilities in public
education and establish new linkages between the economic and political spheres of their
diverse human societies within which they hold legislative power and authoritative capabil-
ities (Human Development Report 2007/2008; DiMento and Doughman 2007a).
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If many of the anticipated consequences of climate change are to be averted or reduced,
efforts to address themmust be commenced before they impact upon daily lives. This presents
an additional political challenge for many sovereign states because voters tend to react to
immediately visible triggers. One of the political issues shaping international climate change
responses is the knowledge that failure to address climate change in a timely manner by
imposing sustainable burdens upon contemporary lifestyles will result in imposing impossible
burdens upon future generations. This creates a disjuncture between the views of ‘urgency’
that states receive and deploy in their decision making concerning impending climate change
consequences and other more readily identified ‘immediate’ imperatives such as avoiding
interest rate increases or the closure of major production facilities.
Alongside the growth of modern political economic arrangements and expectations of
progress, sovereignty has been premised upon expectations of the legal status, authority and
decision-making capacities of states. It has sat alongside visions of international order and
stable relations between states, a distribution of power among political actors and assurances
of civilisational progress. However, in the 21st century, as global climate change requires
states to develop new levels of flexible responsiveness in order to establish effective adapt-
ation strategies and altered forms of human association, sovereignty has become part of a
problem for the international political community (Human Development Report 2007/2008).
By individuating interests among states, sovereignty inevitably favours domestically located
interests over collective good – except in rare circumstances of consensus based collective
will (Gleeson and Low 2001).
As states respond to these pressures and adjust to their evolving status and capacities,
opportunities for consensus will diminish – at least temporarily. As states grapple with
changing expectations of shared responsibilities and mutual interdependencies in seeking
to respond to global climate change impacts they must also recognise that changes to their
physical environments inevitably redistribute sources of authority. These factors also change
the relationship between the various social and economic sectors over which states exercise
authority. Therefore, states will becomemore reliant upon specific knowledge and problems
identification which will produce new forms of commitment to the specific interests they
represent and seek to protect (Thompson 2001; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993).
When states participate in international negotiations concerning climate change and related
environmental problems, they confront very real difficulties in reconciling the competing
demands and imperatives to which they are subject. Their need to protect citizens, ensure
economic prosperity, preserve territorial security and reserve their status as recognised legit-
imate authorities intersect in ways that make it very difficult for them to discern their specific
interests and limit their abilities to respond to grand-scale external problems, such as rising
sea-levels. In this context, sovereignty provides states with an internal compass, a means of
claiming and retaining their status as sovereign authorities, and it is to this touchstone that
states repeatedly return.
State sovereignty continues to provide an important source of stability despite the fact
that critics can readily identify a range of transnational issues that defy individual state res-
olution and which the international community seems reluctant or unable to confront (Holsti
1995). It is also easy to be critical of international inaction on climate change issues, such
as the slow pace at which the Kyoto Protocol was ratified, and the persistent refusal of some
states to join it. However, if one considers more fully the diverse nature of states, and their
inherent levels of competition in maximising their access to resources and security, it is re-
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markable that consensus style actions ever occur in the international political community.
International policies are ‘more likely to be implemented rapidly and effectively when the
objectives sought coincide with a broader range of objectives among parties’ (Edmondson
2001:6). Policy networks and the cycles and routines created by them and preserved in their
organisational structures and processes are also vital contributors to international policy de-
velopment, implementation and refinement (Young 2002).
The international political community confronts considerable difficulty in resolving debates
between and among states concerning who holds responsibilities for progressing climate
change responses and who should bear the costs of their implementation (Matthew 2007;
Roberts and Parks 2007; Achterberg 2001). There are two parts to these debates. First, there
is debate centred upon the relative distribution of burdens and responsibilities among states
and economic actors based upon their past and present contributions to climate change. In
these there exists a crude division between developing and developed states. The developing
states see themselves as further disadvantaged and marginalised by new international efforts
to regulate the technologies and industrial practices they desire (Roberts and Parks 2007).
They believe the greater burden should be shouldered by developed states. Not surprisingly,
the developed states who have been major contributors of greenhouse gases see the situation
differently. They argue that climate change is a global or collective problem that can only
be effectively addressed with all states working and making sacrifices together (Roberts and
Parks 2007; Human Development Report 2007/2008).
Conclusion
Attributing primacy to global responsibilities will enable the international political community
to transcend the limits of interests based claims to international participation and enable
states to re-configure their authoritative status. This enables the achievement of a systematic
evolutionary solution to a structural problem that poses serious threats to the political systems,
societies and people of many states. As international climate change scientists and policy
experts increasingly point out, the more we learn of the potential challenges arising from
global climate change, the more we realise we have yet to learn (Parry, Canziani, Palutikof,
van der Linden and Hanson 2007). The particular complexities of climate change and its
anticipated impacts upon the distribution of water resources, viable agricultural land and
landmass suited to human habitation, means that international political agreement concerning
how to respond to these challenges will be an important component of anymitigation efforts.
However, these very same features also increase the difficulty of attaining international
consensus.
Consensus based decision-making processes and the political structures and institutions
arising from themwill not achieve ‘effective, efficient’ international climate change responses
(Stern 2009). However, the political impacts of global climate change go beyond the chal-
lenges they pose for the forms, locations and distribution of human societies and their centres
of production. It might well be argued that what most ‘threatens us today... is an imbalance
between the supreme authority that still resides... in the sovereign state, and the incipient
but fragmentary and feeble authority of collective institutions’ (Hoffman 1997: ix). In a
sense, this might be fitting for the greatest challenge to have faced human civilisations.
Nonetheless, the prospect that existing core political values might be challenged as a result
11
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of global climate change impacts is a realisation that few political actors might readily accept
and acknowledge.
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